Security, tested and honest
How Advance protects borrowers, savers and the system: what we've tested, how fraud is stopped, how identity grows with your limit, and the risks we haven't solved.
What we've tested
Each of these runs in the project today. The code is public on GitHub.
Every payment splits exactly
A randomized test runs 1,000 payments of random sizes and repayment shares. Repayment + payout always equals the payment, and the account always ends empty.
Losses hit Boost before Steady
Tests write off a loss smaller than Boost (Steady untouched) and one larger than Boost (only the excess reaches Steady).
Signed payments can't be abused
Replaying a signature, changing its amount, or submitting it from the wrong contract are all rejected.
Limits can't be exceeded
Borrowing over the limit, setting limits without permission, and lending past 90% of the pool all fail.
Agents and Chainlink reports
Only an agent's real owner can link it; only the Chainlink forwarder can submit score reports.
Document encryption
A self-check proves the owner and the chosen lender can open a file, a stranger can't, and no plain text leaks into what's stored.
Rehearsed on a copy of Monad testnet
Full deployment, the Kuru market, ERC-8004 agent registration, buying and selling, run against the real deployed Kuru and registry contracts.
Every screen clicked through
Sign-up, advance, client payment and split, savings deposit, encrypted sharing and agents tested end to end in a browser.
Scratch cards can't be farmed
A randomized test draws 1,000 cards with random luck, timing and advance sizes: a card is never worth the fee. Paying yourself back wins nothing; a missed advance wipes unclaimed points.
Live on Monad testnet
Contracts deployed, Boost listed on Kuru at fair value, and the full demo (four clients pay, score, $50 limit set onchain) run on the public site in 11 seconds.
Independent security audit
Required before any meaningful amount of real money.
Catching fake income
The obvious trick: pay yourself from a second account and pretend it's a client.
Meet Sybil Sam
Sam sends money to two brand-new accounts. Those accounts then "pay" Sam, so it looks like he has two clients.
Check Sam's score yourself- Payer A was funded by Sam's own account before it "paid" him
- Payer B was funded by Sam's own account before it "paid" him
- 2 payers have almost no payment history of their own
Identity that grows with your limit
Asking for a passport to borrow $50 would shut out the people Advance is for. So checks grow as limits grow.
| Level | Limit | What we ask for | What it stops | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 to 2 | $50 to $200 | Your passkey and onchain income. Every address checked against sanctions lists. | Sanctioned users. Amounts too small to be worth faking. | Live |
| 3 | $1,000 | Proof you're one unique person (World ID, zkPassport or Self). No name or document stored. | One person running many accounts; family and friend rings. | Next |
| 4 | $5,000+ | Full KYC through a licensed partner, plus verified income (employer, payroll, or a bank or Upwork proof). | Fake income; lets a big default be pursued legally. | Next |
| Via partners | Any | Users verified by a partner payment or payroll app arrive pre-checked. | All of the above, with no extra steps. | Next |
Private by design
Personal data never touches the blockchain. A licensed partner checks you; only a stamp goes onchain ("passed KYC", "unique human", "not sanctioned").
Regulation
Lending above small amounts needs a licensed partner in each country, the same route Credit Coop and 3Jane use today.
How the system itself is protected
Advance never holds your money
Your Advance address splits each payment in the same transaction and keeps nothing.
A stolen key is capped
Limits are capped by level inside the contract; the scorer can be paused instantly.
No passwords to steal
Accounts are passkeys. Nothing to phish, no seed phrase to lose.
Documents stay encrypted
Encrypted on your device; only you and a lender you choose can open them. Not even Advance.
What we haven't solved yet
Redirected income
A borrower can ask clients to pay a different address. Small limits and public defaults keep it small; partner apps that route payments are the long-term fix.
Collusion between real people
No lender can read intent. A friend with a real salary can prop someone up for $50. Circles (friends guaranteeing each other) are the next defence.
Not yet audited
The contracts are tested but not externally audited. That comes before real money at scale.